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Cohen: The Commerce Clause Under Marshall, Taney, and Waite
WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY
THE COm EnCE CLAusE UNDER MARSHALL, TANMY, AND WAITE.

By Felix Frankfurter. Chapel Hill, N. C. University of North
Carolina Press, 1937. Pp. 114.
The strains of the judicial symphony of 1801-1888 are with us
once again. The baton, the tempo, the tone-quality of the instruments are not the same, but the score remains essentially unchanged. Echoes of nationalism, state's rights, legislative aissezfeire, and judicial supremacy resound loudly throughout the great
halls of justice. It is fortunate for the lay auditor that he has at
his disposal such excellent program notes as those prepared by
Professor Frankfurter.
Professor Frankfurter selects one single theme, interstate
commerce, and traces its variations through the virtuosity of Chief
Justices Marshall, Taney, and Waite. Narrow as the theme may
be, it nevertheless illuminates the entire judicial horizon, and
brings into bold relief the patterns of our current judicial struggles. We can clearly recognize in the present court, vestiges of
Marshall's organic theory of commerce, Taney's cautious adherence
to the dichotomy of federal structure, and Waite's obliging deference to legislative policy.
Marshall, today, would haye found no difficulty in sanctioning
federal encroachment into the zone of usual state activity. In Gibbons v. Ogden he endowed us with a concept of interstate commerce
sufficiently ambiguous and therefore elastic enough to cloak whatever powers the national government would desire. Mr. Justice
Holmes once wrote, "There fell to Marshall perhaps the greatest
place that was ever filled by a judge." That he took advantage
of his lot is to be seen in the tremendous impetus that his views on
national power gave to the court even beyond his time.
Professor Frankfurter makes one hesitate in ascribing to Taney
the usual fanaticism of "state's rights" philosophy. He points
out that Taney's alleged passion for state dominance, especially
in the field of the commerce power, was no more than a refusal to
believe that non-action on the part of the national government implied state paralysis. Ile is zealous in his desire to explode the
Taney pro-slavery myth, asserting that it was "not slavery, but
Taney's fear of the growing power of northern finance" that "was
most clearly reflected in his opinions"; and that "one hopes it will
become intellectually disreputable to see him predominantly as the
judicial defender of slavery."
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The chief virtue of Waite was his appreciation of the narrowness of judicial power. He was willing that the court volunteer
some of its blood in order to check the possibility of legislative
anemia. His judicious altruism provided soil for the sprouting of
Munn v. Illinois, and unwittingly brought nurture for a subsequent
expansion of Congressional powers into the field of economic
activity. Waite certainly lacked the statesmanship of Marshall, the
"artistic felicity" of Holmes, and the legal brilliance of Brandeis.
But it is to his credit to say that a consistent application of his doctrine would today have carried up quite far from the deadening
silence of what some have called "the no-man's zone" of inactivity.
Professor Frankfurter at the end of his little book quotes with
unsparing approval a lengthy passage from James Bradley Thayer's, Our New Possessions. The passage seems to endow the Constitution with a pair of heavenly wings, and detracts from the realist's conception of that instrument as being continuously handcarved. One is left with the impression that only our imperfect
vision has prevented us from understanding its full meaning that the Constitution is actually "wiser and more far-looking than
man had ever thought." On page three, however, the author tells
us realistically that "the judicial application of the Constitution
is a function of the dominant forces of our society". Just what
prompted him to deviate from his usual path of realism is not clear.
JuLius COHEN.
West Virginia University,
Morgantown, West Virginia.
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